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In a crowded hall buzzing with chatter, two strangers lock eyes. A shared language instantly connects them, creating an unspoken bond of trust. But in this digital age, this trust is being weaponized. Through it, misinformation spreads faster because it is wrapped in familiar words that make language a powerful tool for manipulation.
Social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and TikTok amplify this effect by building virtual communities where language signals identity and trust. People cluster around influencers who speak their language—literally and figuratively—shaping discourse and reinforcing narratives. When false claims appear in a widely spoken dialect, they spread rapidly, often unchecked.
Linguistic similarity fosters trust as people naturally align with those who share their language and culture. Social identity theory explains this instinct, while the Illusory Truth Effect shows how repetition makes information seem true. When misinformation circulates in familiar languages, especially in grassroots communities, it feels more credible, making language both a tool for trust and manipulation.
“Peddlers of language-based disinformation manipulate public perception by distorting information and injecting narratives that align with their agenda,” says Hamza Ibrahim, a disinformation expert. “They employ various tactics, such as selectively adding or removing details, and use techniques like narration or commentary to make their disinformation more persuasive and engaging”
“When people hear information in their native language, they tend to trust it more,” adds Danjuma Hassan, a linguist and psychologist. “Familiar words create a sense of comfort and credibility, which can make individuals less likely to question what they hear, even if it’s false”
Digital influencers play a key role in this process. Whether it’s political propaganda, health misinformation, or historical revisionism, language-based trust makes narratives easier to embed and harder for fact-checkers to dismantle.
TikTok, Language and Manipulation
In a viral TikTok video by @Sani Aliyu638, a crowd chants in Hausa: “Sojoji muke so! Sojoji muke so!” (“We want soldiers! We want soldiers!”) while waving leaves and Russian flags. The video implies grassroots support for military rule, aligning with foreign-backed authoritarian narratives.
On TikTok, such videos serve as propaganda tools, leveraging the power of visual and linguistic familiarity to shape public perception. The use of Hausa, a widely spoken language across Northern Nigeria, Niger, and other Sahelian states—ensures that the message aligns deeply with local communities. By tapping into regional grievances and frustrations, these videos create a narrative that military rule is the preferred alternative to democracy.
TikTok’s algorithm, designed to boost engagement, does not distinguish between organic discourse and manipulated narratives. Once such content gains traction, it reinforces the illusion of popular demand, further embedding narratives that undermine democracy.
Other accounts including Sanialiyu638, nasi1germany, directorkano, danib714, danmakaranta62, sadeeqaminu90, hajjims_fashion_empire, ke3307077114701, user5272798653617, nansglobal, abubakarsadeec2, shamsuadamu8, farin_gani_furniture, oppicialbuk, play_station_and_xbox, ahmadmuhammad3398, kabir4331, lawanson190, ashirashir793, 03okasha, idrees_a_yareeko, princesaraki1, jaridararewa, a.y.el.mubarak.textile, daddy__jan__wuya01, and oppicialbuk share similar content. They blend genuine grievances with foreign-aligned disinformation.
Many of these posts received multiple comments from users who understood Hausa and, in some way, affirmed the content of the video.
For instance, Oppicialbuk shared footage of himself and a crowd of young people protesting during the #EndBadGovernance protest, where people were cursing the president of Nigeria while waving the Russian flag.
One user in the comment section responded, “Allah ya Baku nasara,” meaning “May God give you victory.” Other comments included users using emojis to praise the movement.
Nasi1germany, who had significant engagement on his protest-related posts, garnered over 836,000 views, 9,337 shares, 5,550 bookmarks, 3,885 comments, and over 60,000 likes. This was just one of multiple posts he had repeatedly shared on his TikTok page. See other samples here, here, here, here, here, and here.
While this may initially appear as a smear campaign or a pro-Russian discourse, these accounts have also been traced to spreading various false narratives, AI-generated content, and other anti-democratic and culturally driven misinformation. However, one alarming observation within this network of accounts is that some users primarily share regular content but have, deliberately or inadvertently, contributed to magnifying a campaign they might not fully understand or grasp its far-reaching effects. This trend explains how language can push people to promote disinformation without realising the consequences.
Hassan explains that repetition in a familiar language strengthens belief, especially when combined with visuals and emotionally charged content.
“TikTok’s algorithm intensifies this effect by continuously feeding similar content to users and broadening the existing bias they have. This cycle is further fuelled by users who unknowingly amplify disinformation,” he said.
“Many people don’t intentionally spread falsehoods but share content because it feels authentic, aligns with their worldview, or resonates with their cultural identity. This is why misinformation in local languages spreads so rapidly because it feels personal and deeply relatable,” Hassan added.
DUBAWA examined the frequency of key Hausa-language hashtags and terms used in political discussions to analyse the spread of authoritarian narratives on TikTok. Our findings reveal that certain words gained significant traction, particularly during key events. The most frequently appearing terms include ‘Gwamnatin Najeriya’ (Nigerian government), Zabe (election), Zangazanga (protest), Rikici na siyasa (political conflict), Yada karya (spreading lies), Talakawa (common people), and Daurin talauci (poverty entrapment), alongside Russiya (Russia) and Arewa (Northern Nigeria), which suggest a possible geopolitical angle or regional influence in the discourse.
DUBAWA identified four TikTok accounts (nansglobal,kabir4331, lawanson190, jaridararewa, Nasi1germany) with the highest engagement on posts advocating for a military takeover and analysed their interactions. Many of the comments supported the narrative, with users expressing approval for a shift in governance. Compared to neutral or opposing views, affirming responses dominated the discussions, demonstrating how language and familiarity influence public sentiment.
The infographic below visualises this engagement pattern, categorising interactions into support, opposition, and neutrality.
Stacked column chart displaying TikTok engagements across four accounts
This demonstrates how language and familiarity influence public sentiment. Ibrahim further explains how disinformation merchants exploit local languages, particularly in digital spaces dominated by grassroots communities.
“Local language is being misused by disinformation merchants because many conversations happen in local languages, particularly in digital spaces where grassroots communities engage. Since many of these individuals lack media literacy, they become easy targets for information disorder. Disinformation is widespread on WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages. Some of these false narratives are exclusively peddled in local languages, influencing how people think and act,” he said.
Offline Impact
While TikTok and other digital platforms serve as breeding grounds for disinformation, the impact extends far beyond online. In Northern Nigeria, where linguistic and cultural ties transcend borders, disinformation spread in local languages is not confined to social media; it seeps into real-life conversations, influencing perceptions, political leanings, and even security dynamics.
The porous borders between Nigeria and its neighbours, particularly Niger, facilitate an easy flow of people, goods, and, crucially, narratives. Many individuals from Niger migrate to Nigeria for work, trade, and social interactions, blending seamlessly into communities due to shared languages like Hausa and Kanuri.
This cultural fluidity makes it easier for online disinformation narratives to find a willing audience offline. A politically charged message circulated on TikTok can quickly become a talking point in marketplaces, mosques, and transport hubs, spreading further through word of mouth. Over time, these narratives gain legitimacy simply because they are repeated often and reinforced within familiar social settings.
“Language is not just a tool for communication; it is a vehicle for influence,” Hassan warns. “What begins as an online rumour in Hausa or Kanuri can easily become a widely accepted truth in everyday conversations that then shapes opinions and even real-world actions.”
Who Benefits from Language-Based Disinformation?
The spread of disinformation in local languages can serve the interests of various actors, including foreign influence networks, local political figures, and ideological groups. By embedding false narratives in widely spoken regional languages, these entities can achieve several objectives:
- Influencing Political Sentiment: Disinformation disseminated in languages such as Hausa or Kanuri can shape public perceptions regarding governance, elections, and foreign allies. For instance, narratives promoting military rule or external interventions can create pressure points that may destabilise democratic structures.
- Expanding Ideological Reach: Extremist groups, foreign propaganda networks, and political disruptors often utilise local languages to recruit supporters or foster dissent against governments. Using familiar language can create a sense of belonging, making individuals more susceptible to aligning with these narratives.
- Creating Cross-Border Spillover Effects: Regions with porous borders, such as Northern Nigerian states neighbouring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, are particularly susceptible to the spread of disinformation. A narrative that gains traction in one country can easily cross into neighbouring nations, potentially leading to regional instability, diminished trust in governance, and opportunities for foreign actors to manipulate public discourse.
Conclusion
Language-driven disinformation doesn’t remain online; it seeps into real-world interactions, especially in border regions with strong linguistic and cultural ties. In Northern Nigeria, narratives from neighbouring states like Niger can fuel political discontent and erode trust in governance. If unchecked, this could deepen instability and increase susceptibility to foreign influence. Combating this requires media literacy, fact-checking in local languages, and proactive efforts to curb manipulative narratives before they take hold.
